Sino Strategies: China's Influence & its Implications for the U.S.

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Summary

• Former Minister Jin Zhuanglong has been removed as part of Xi Jinping’s efforts to consolidate power and combat military-industrial corruption, particularly within the PLA’s Rocket Force.
• The PLA’s missile division, responsible for China’s strategic deterrence, has been plagued by corruption due to its large budget and low oversight, especially regarding nuclear weapons.

Political Purging in Beijing

Former Chinese Minister of Industry and Information Technology Jin Zhuanglong has been purged from his post. He has been missing from the public eye for two months, and Li Lecheng was recently announced as Zhuanglong’s successor in the State Council. Zhuanglong is an official who was pro-tech modernization, and now he is part of a growing list of high-ranking officials who have been purged, including former Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang, National People’s Congress Standing Committee members Lieutenant General You Haitao and Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng, and over a dozen other officials. 

These removals are likely driven by several factors. For one, Xi Jinping’s desire to consolidate political power would drive him to remove any apparent dissidents or political offenders, and these removals would also discourage other political figures from committing acts or supporting policies that might be perceived as going against the rule of Xi Jinping. The other significant, and related, role that Xi’s political purging might play is in combating military-industrial corruption. 

Rocket Force Corruption

The People’s Liberation Army has been plagued by corruption for several decades, despite best efforts by the CCP to reduce it. One division of the PLA that has been especially hard-hit by corruption is the PLA’s Second Artillery Force, or Rocket Force. The Rocket Force is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the PRC’s strategic land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces as well as their supporting elements and bases. 

The Rocket Force fulfills several objectives for the PRC, including strategic deterrence, suppression of enemy air defenses, and “not allowing any inimical force access to Chinese space: land, air, or sea, and deny the enemy any space to fight a battle near the Chinese territory, including Taiwan;” the PLARF’s near-term objectives include “enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces, and enhancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build a strong and modernized rocket force.” 

As the Rocket Force has grown, so too has the Force’s budget. Indeed, the missile industry is among China’s most well-funded defense portfolios. This leaves the opportunity for many actors involved with Chinese missiles to line their pockets with monies dedicated for rocket R&D. Furthermore, the risk of being exposed is low for missiles reserved for nuclear missions. The level of day-to-day readiness for these systems is low, so there is a reduced need to constantly test such missiles for their readiness. The combination of large funds and low risk of exposure makes this a ripe area for corruption. 

Implications for the U.S.

1. U.S. Policy Implications

The continued political purge of China’s top ranking officials indicates continued political instability and corruption within the CCP leadership. For U.S. Policymakers, this could mean increased political leverage in future negotiations.

At the same time, as Xi Jinping continues his crackdown against corruption, CCP leadership may decide to modify its funding mechanisms and readiness requirements of PLA missiles. This could involve an amendment to its No-First-Use clause — although that scenario is unlikely given historical precedent. At any rate, U.S. foreign policymakers should continue to closely monitor the PRC’s rocket force and nuclear missile stockpile.

2. U.S. Business Implications

For American businesses, Chinese military-industrial corruption could be a sign of significant instability in China’s aerospace industry. American aerospace & defense companies, especially in the manufacturing and R&D verticals, might consider proceeding with caution when deciding whether to create ties with Chinese companies in this field.